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Abstract
Since World War II, permanent interest rate shocks have driven nearly all of
the fluctuations of U.S. M1 velocity, which is cointegrated with the short rate,
and most of the long-horizon variation in the velocity of M2-M1. Permanent
velocity shocks specific to M2-M1, on the other hand, have played a minor
role. Further, counterfactual simulations show that, absent permanent interest
rate shocks, M1 velocity would have been broadly flat, and fluctuations in the
velocity of M2-M1 would have been more subdued than they have historically
been. We show that failure to distinguish between M1 and M2-M1 causes a
significant distortion of the inference, erroneously pointing towards a dominant
role for M2 velocity shocks.
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1 Introduction
In his classic investigation of the dynamics of U.S. money velocity since the times of
the Civil War (1861-1865), Richard Selden (1956) pointed out that
‘[e]conomists have been talking about the velocity of circulation of money and
related concepts for nearly three hundred years. [...] Prior to the Great De-
pression most economists [assumed] velocity to be essentially constant for short
normal periods. Since the early 1930s, however, there has been a growing con-
viction that the velocity of money is highly volatile and undependable [...].’
Selden summarized his main findings as providing
‘little support to the hypothesis that velocity movements are mainly a result of
changes in the cost of holding money. Whatever role the cost of holding money
may have had during some periods of our history, it cannot account for the
major velocity changes between 1919 and 1951.’
Six decades after the publication of Selden’s work, the conventional wisdom in
the macroeconomics profession is quite remarkably little changed: As John Cochrane
(1998) put it in his exploration of the fiscal theory of the price level,
‘[m]oney demand relations are dominated by velocity shocks [...]’.1
The main reason behind this view is the alleged disappearance, starting from
the early 1980s, of any previously identified stable relationship between monetary
aggregates, GDP, and interest rates. For the United States, for example, researchers
such as Friedman and Kuttner (1992) documented the breakdown, during those years,
of any stable long-run demand for several alternative monetary aggregates.2 The
standard explanation for such evidence of widespread instability in money-demand
relationships is that velocity shocks play a sizeable, or even a dominant role.
The literature3 discusses three main sources of velocity shocks:
() financial deepening, defined as the increase in the size of the financial sector as
a fraction of GDP4 which is associated with the early stages of economic development.
Since, ceteris paribus, financial deepening causes an increase in both the non interest-
bearing demand deposits which are part of M1, and the interest-bearing components
which are part of the non-M1 portion of broader aggregates (e.g., savings deposits),
it automatically causes a decline in money velocity.
1Emphasis in the original.
2By the same token, in the Euro area, the European Central Bank’s so-called ‘monetary pillar’
(a ‘reference value’ for the annual growth rate of M3 derived from a money demand equation) has
come to be seen as too unreliable to be of any use at all.
3See e.g. Bordo and Jonung (2009).
4And therefore in the ratios between its nominal assets and liabilities, and nominal GDP.
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() Technological advances in the payments and, more generally, financial system.
Innovations such as credit cards or electronic cash management techniques, for ex-
ample, reduce the transactions demand for money for any level of the interest rate,
thus causing a corresponding increase in velocity. By the same token, the introduc-
tion of new financial instruments which satisfy asset demand motives previously met
by (demand or savings) deposits decreases the demand for the latter, thus causing,
again, an increase in velocity.
() Institutional changes such as the introduction of unemployment benefits and
public pension schemes decrease the precautionary demand for monetary assets for
any level of the interest rate, thus causing, again, an increase in velocity.
In advanced countries such as the United States the process of financial deepening
had largely been completed by World War I, but in other countries it either had been
going on until recently, or it is still ongoing. Since in the present work we focus on
the United States (and to a lesser extent Canada) since World War I, velocity shocks
originating from financial deepening are, for our own purposes, essentially irrelevant,
and technological advances in the financial system, and institutional changes, are
therefore the main source of exogenous variation in velocity.
The view we take in this paper is at odds with today’s conventional wisdom about
the dominant role of velocity shocks in money-demand relationships. Specifically, we
argue that most of the low-frequency fluctuations in U.S. and Canadian money veloc-
ity since World War I have not been caused by exogenous velocity shocks, and they
have rather originated from the permanent interest rate fluctuations which, histori-
cally, have been one of the defining features of the period following the collapse of the
Classical Gold Standard, in August 1914.5 We argue that the permanent variation in
nominal interest rates of the post-Gold Standard era has been mostly, or even entirely
unrelated to ‘authentic’ velocity shocks (i.e. shocks originating from either financial
deepening, technological advances, or institutional changes). In particular, conceptu-
ally in line with Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and with the most recent analysis of
Benati and Ireland (2017), we show that during the interwar period fluctuations in
U.S. interest rates had been driven, to a dominant extent, by shocks to the money
multiplier (in particular, shocks to the reserves/deposits ratio) associated with the
Great Depression episode. By the same token, during the post-WWII period perma-
nent fluctuations in U.S. interest rates have been largely caused by the permanent
inflation shocks mostly associated with the Great Inflation episode, and by shocks to
the real interest rate.
Our main substantive results can be summarized as follows.
5In fact, marking the exact date of the end of the metallic standards era is all but impossible, as
Richard Nixon’s closing of the ‘gold window’ in August 1971 was the culmination of a decades-long
unravelling process which had started with WWI. (For a fascinating discussion of such progressive
unravelling, see e.g. Barro (1982).) We take August 1914 as the date marking the end of metallic
standard mostly because we regard World War I as the single most important shock to the Gold
Standard.
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Since World War II, permanent interest rate shocks unrelated to ‘authentic’ veloc-
ity disturbances have driven nearly all of the fluctuations of U.S. M1 velocity–which
is cointegrated with the short rate (see Benati, Lucas, Nicolini, and Weber, 2018;
henceforth, BLNW)–and most of the long-horizon variation in the velocity of the
M2-M1 aggregate. Permanent velocity shocks specific to M2-M1, on the other hand,
have played a minor role. Further, counterfactual simulations show that, absent such
permanent interest rate shocks, M1 velocity would have been broadly flat, and fluc-
tuations in the velocity of M2-M1 would have been more subdued than they have
historically been.
We also show that failure to distinguish between M1 and M2-M1 causes a sig-
nificant distortion of the inference, erroneously pointing towards a dominant role for
M2 velocity shocks. The reason for this is straightforward: Since, as we document,
permanent interest rate shocks have an opposite effect on the velocities of M1 and
M2-M1–due to the permanent portfolio reallocations they induce out of (into) non
interest-bearing M1, and into (out of) interest-bearing M2-M1–failure to split M2
into its two components causes the shocks’ impacts to largely cancel out in the ag-
gregate. As a result, this spuriously creates the need for another ‘shock’ in order to
explain the long-horizon dynamics of M2 velocity.
As for the period between the two World Wars, although evidence is more com-
plex, and different under a number of dimensions–in particular, all identified shocks
induced similar responses in the velocities of either M1, or M2-M1–a consistent find-
ing is that, once again, ‘authentic’ velocity shocks played a uniformly minor role in
driving velocity series, as well as other macroeconomic variables.
Our main conclusion is therefore that the macroeconomic profession’s widespread
consensus about the dominant role played by velocity shocks in driving money demand
relationships is the figment of two errors:
first–and least importantly–a dominant focus on the post-WWII period. As
mentioned, based on interwar data velocity shocks play a uniformly minor-to-negligible
role, no matter how you ‘slide and dice’ the monetary data.
Second–and crucially–failure to split broader monetary aggregates into M1,
whose velocity entails a strong and stable relationship with short-term nominal rates,
and the non-M1 component, which, as we will see in the case of M2, almost does, but
not quite, thus implying the presence of ‘small’ velocity shocks.
Although at odds with contemporary thinking in monetary economics, our conclu-
sions are very much in the spirit of an older literature best exemplified by the work
of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, stressing the broad stability of monetary
relationships, and the dangers caused by the instability in the monetary regime.
We reach these conclusions by working with cointegrated structural VARs iden-
tified via long-run restrictions. In fact, however, the economic logic underlying our
re-interpretation of post-Gold Standard monetary history is extraordinarily simple,
and can be briefly outlined as follows.
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Figure 1  Short-term interest rates since the late XVII century 
 
1.1 A summary of our argument
Before World War I, short-term interest rates had been strongly stationary for cen-
turies,6 reflecting the white noise character of inflation induced by monetary regimes
based on metallic standards.7 As extensively documented by BLNW (2018), on the
other hand, since 1914
() short-term rates have been uniformly I(1) in all of the 32 countries in their
dataset, reflecting the fact that, as first documented by Barsky (1987), under post-
Gold Standard regimes inflation has typically acquired a unit root;8 and
() in many cases, short-term rates have been cointegrated with M1 velocity, thus
pointing towards the existence of a stable long-run demand for M1. This is the case,
e.g., for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland,
and for several high-, or very high-inflation countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, and Israel).
Figure 1 provides a stark illustration of changes in the integration properties of
short-term nominal interest rates since the late XVII century. Before World War I
short rates had been either literally constant–as in the United Kingdom between
1721 and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars–or manifestly stationary (for sta-
tistical evidence on this, see footnote 6). Since the collapse of the Classical Gold
Standard, on the other hand, visual evidence clearly suggests that–in line with the
results from BLNW’s (2018) unit root tests–short rates have acquired a permanent
component. In particular, in all of the countries shown in Figure 1, nominal short-
term rates have exhibited, over the post-WWII period, a dramatic and historically
unprecedented hump-shaped fluctuation, associated with the Great Inflation episode
and the subsequent disinflation. For the interwar period evidence is mixed, but in
the United States the short rate had exhibited a sizeable fall from 3-5 per cent to-
wards zero. In fact, as we will discuss in Section 2, unit root tests clearly suggest that
U.S. nominal interest rates had, and have been I(1) during both the interwar and the
post-WWII periods.
The presence of a permanent component in U.S. nominal interest rates during the
period following the collapse of the Classical Gold Standard logically implies that,
since 1914, permanent interest rates shocks have been the only driver of U.S. M1
6Table I in the Appendix reports results from Elliot et al.’s (1996) unit root tests for the central
bank rate for the United Kingdom (1816-1913), France (1800-1913), Austria (1818-1913), Norway
(1819-1913), Sweden (1856-1913), Finland (1867-1913), Spain (1874-1913), and Japan (1883-1913).
(The methodology is discussed in Section 3 below.) With the single exception of Japan–for which
evidence is ambiguous (possibly because of the comparatively short sample period)–in all other
cases the tests strongly reject a unit root in the central bank rate.
7See in particular Barsky (1987) and Benati (2008).
8In fact, things are more complicated than this. In particular, for the United States evidence of
a unit root in inflation is strong only for the post-WWII period. This is why, in what follows, we
perform our analysis by sub-sample. Further, as documented by Benati (2008), following the end
of the Great Inflation, evidence of a unit root in inflation has largely vanished. This has especially
been the case for countries which have adopted explicit inflation targets.
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Figure 2  United States and Canada: Scatterplots of the short rate and of money  
             velocity for M1 and M2-M1, and low-frequency components of the series 
 
velocity at the frequency zero (i.e., in the infinite long run).
Now, suppose–just for the moment–that the long-run demand for the non-M1
component of M2 is also stable, so that, under post-Gold Standard regimes, the
velocity of M2-M1 has also been cointegrated with the short rate. Under these cir-
cumstances, a positive (negative) permanent shock to the short rate would cause
(1) a permanent increase (decrease) in M1 velocity, as economic agents switch
from non interest-bearing M1 to interest-bearing assets, such as those included in the
non-M1 component of M2, and
(2) precisely because of this, a permanent decrease (increase) in the velocity of
M2-M1.
If we relax the unrealistic (and, in fact, counterfactual) assumption of cointegra-
tion between the short rate and the velocity of M2-M1, by allowing it to also being
affected by ‘small’ permanent velocity shocks specific to this aggregate, the negative
relationship at the very low frequencies between the two series should become some-
how ‘blurred’, but it should still be possible to recover it by applying low-frequency
filtering techniques.
The evidence reported in Figure 2 is consistent with this view. The figure shows,
in the first column, scatterplots of a short-term nominal interest rate and of the
velocity of either M1 or M2-M1, for either the United States or Canada; and in the
second and third columns, the low-frequency components of the same series.9 The
evidence in the figure speaks for itself: In particular, focusing on the low-frequency
components of the data,
first, conceptually in line with BLNW (2018), for both countries the relationship
between the short rate and M1 velocity appears as remarkably strong, clearly positive,
and apparently stable.
Second, the relationship between the short rate and the velocity of M2-M1 is
strongly and uniformly negative, and apparently stable, in Canada–thus reflecting
the previously mentioned portfolio reallocation mechanism associated with permanent
interest rate shocks–whereas in the United States it has been clearly negative since
the 1940s, and positive before that.
The evidence in Figure 1 logically points towards two conclusions:
[I] absent permanent interest rate shocks–which, as previously mentioned, was
the ‘normal state of affairs’ under metallic standards–the low-frequency component
of M1 velocity should have been essentially flat, and fluctuations in the corresponding
component of M2-M1 velocity should have been much more subdued.
[II] Since, as we show in Section 2, M2 velocity is not cointegrated with the short
rate, failure to distinguish between M1 and M2-M1 inevitably distorts the inference,
pointing towards a larger role for velocity shocks than it is in fact the case. As
mentioned, the reason for this is straightforward: Since permanent interest rate shocks
9Low-frequency components have been extracted via the band-pass filter proposed by Christiano
and Fitzgerald (2003), and the ‘low-frequencies’ have been defined as in Benati (2009), as the set of
all fluctuations in the series with cycles slower than 30 years.
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have an opposite effect on the velocities of the M1 and non-M1 components, their
impact will partly, or even mostly cancel out in the aggregate. In turn, as a matter
of logic this will spuriously create the need for another shock in order to explain the
long-horizon dynamics of M2 velocity.
Another way of putting this is that failure to distinguish between M1 and M2-M1
automatically causes a fraction of permanent interest rate shocks to be mis-interpreted
as velocity shocks. As we show based on cointegrated structural VARs, evidence for
the United States and Canada since World War I provides very strong support for
both [I] and [II], thus suggesting that a dominant portion of the fluctuations in U.S.
and Canadian money velocity over the last century has originated from the permanent
interest rate fluctuations which have been one of the hallmarks of post-Gold Standard
monetary regimes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the unit root and cointegra-
tion properties of the data, whereas section 3 describes the empirical methodology
we use in the main body of the paper, based on cointegrated structural VARs identi-
fied via long-run restrictions. Section 4 discusses the evidence for the United States,
whereas Section 5 discusses that for Canada. Section 6 concludes, and discusses pos-
sible directions for future research.
2 Integration and Cointegration Properties of the
Data
2.1 Unit root tests
Tables 1a and 1b report, for the periods 1959Q1-2008Q3 and January 1919-November
1941, respectively, bootstrapped p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996)
unit root tests for the series in our dataset.10 For the post-WWII period we end the
sample in 2008Q3, in order to avoid possible distortions induced by the subsequent
explosion in the monetary base associated with quantitative easing policies. By the
same token, we end the interwar period one month before the attack on Pearl Harbour,
thus avoiding the possible distortions in the inference originating from World War
II and its aftermath. For all series exhibiting obvious trends the tests are based on
models including an intercept and a time trend.11 These series are the logarithms
of nominal M0, and nominal M0, real GDP and real consumption per capita for the
10For either series, p-values have been computed by bootstrapping 10,000 times estimated
ARIMA(p,1,0) processes. In all cases, the bootstrapped processes are of length equal to the se-
ries under investigation. As for the lag order, p, since, as it is well known, results from unit root
tests may be sensitive to the specific lag order which is being used, for reasons of robustness we
consider four alternative lag orders:  = 1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters for the former period, and  = 3, 6,
9, or 12 months for the latter one.
11The reason for including a time trend is that, as discussed e.g. by Hamilton (1994, pp. 501),
the model used for unit root tests should be a meaningful one also under the alternative.
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Table 1a United States, 1959Q1-2008Q3: Bootstrapped
p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests
Lag order:
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4
In levels, without a time trend
GDP deflator inflation 0.073 0.203 0.295 0.239
3-month Treasury bill rate 0.304 0.298 0.312 0.207
10-year government bond yield 0.583 0.580 0.530 0.542
M1 velocity 0.507 0.481 0.472 0.440
M2 velocity 0.683 0.685 0.638 0.596
Velocity of M2-M1 0.914 0.917 0.904 0.882
Multiplier of M2-M1 0.250 0.522 0.517 0.499
In levels, with a time trend
Log nominal M0 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004
Log nominal M0 per capita 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Log real GDP per capita 0.435 0.419 0.267 0.193
Log real consumption per capita 0.782 0.703 0.512 0.498
In differences,
without a time trend
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4
GDP deflator inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3-month Treasury bill rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10-year government bond yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M1 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Velocity of M2-M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Multiplier of M2-M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log real GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log real consumption per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA processes.
Table 1b United States, January 1919-November 1941:
Bootstrapped p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock
unit root tests
Lag order:
p=3 p=6 p=9 p=12
In levels, without a time trend
CPI inflation 0.006 0.036 0.036 0.005
New York FED discount rate 0.630 0.538 0.596 0.573
High grade bond rate 0.837 0.816 0.711 0.454
Logarithm of (1 + ) 0.557 0.410 0.071 0.106
Logarithm of ( + ) 0.935 0.893 0.707 0.727
 0.542 0.425 0.071 0.102
 0.910 0.889 0.825 0.700
M1 velocity 0.184 0.261 0.138 0.173
M2 velocity 0.127 0.114 0.049 0.066
Velocity of M2-M1 0.285 0.176 0.103 0.115
In levels, with a time trend
Log M0 0.844 0.890 0.771 0.870
Log CPI 0.648 0.380 0.557 0.949
Log industrial production 0.789 0.773 0.377 0.583
Log department store sales 0.897 0.679 0.626 0.643
In differences,
without a time trend
p=3 p=6 p=9 p=12
Log CPI 0.007 0.037 0.036 0.004
New York FED discount rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
High grade bond rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Logarithm of (1 + ) 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.018
Logarithm of ( + ) 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.025
 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.017
 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.014
M1 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
M2 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002
Velocity of M2-M1 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.009
Log M0 0.000 0.003 0.077 0.030
Log industrial production 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001
Log department store sales 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.035
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA proces-
ses.  = currency/deposits ratio.  = reserve/deposits ratio.
Table 1c Canada, 1926-2006: Bootstrapped p-values
for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests
Lag order:
p=1 p=2
In levels, without
a time trend
Bank of Canada rate 0.381 0.481
10-year government bond yield 0.714 0.767
M1 velocity 0.781 0.799
M2 velocity 0.386 0.216
Velocity of M2-M1 0.4811 0.351
In levels, with
a time trend
Log real GDP per capita 0.671 0.350
Log real consumption per capita 0.851 0.775
In differences,
without a time trend
p=1 p=2
Bank of Canada rate 0.000 0.000
10-year government bond yield 0.000 0.000
M1 velocity 0.002 0.014
M2 velocity 0.000 0.000
Velocity of M2-M1 0.000 0.000
Log real GDP per capita 0.000 0.000
Log real consumption per capita 0.000 0.000
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA
processes.
post-WWII period; and the logarithms of nominal M0, the CPI, industrial production,
and department store sales for the interwar period.12 For all other series the tests are
based on models including an intercept, but no time trend. As for the determinants
of the M1 multiplier for the interwar period,13 we report results both for the levels
of the currency/deposits and reserves/deposits ratios ( and , respectively), and for
the logarithms of the numerator and denominator of the multiplier–that is: ln(1+)
and ln(+), respectively. The rationale for also reporting results for the two latter
variables is that, in Section 4, we will identify permanent shocks to  and  by entering
ln(1+) and ln(+) in cointegrated VARs, and then imposing a Cholesky structure
on the respective (2×2) block of the long-run impact matrix of the structural shocks.
Because of this, we want to be sure that not only  and , but also ln(1+) and
ln(+) are I(1).
For the interwar period the results pertaining to velocity series should be taken
with a pinch of salt. As discussed in the data appendix, indeed, before 1947 U.S. GDP
(or GNP) is only available at the annual frequency. Rather than resorting to using
the reconstructed GNP quarterly data from Robert Gordon and his co-authors–see,
e.g., Balke and Gordon (1986)–we have preferred to use industrial production as an
inevitably imprecise proxy for GNP. As a result, we have computed the logarithms of
velocity series as the difference between the log of the relevant monetary aggregate,
and the sum of the logarithms of industrial production and the CPI.
At the 10 per cent significance level we take as our benchmark throughout the
entire paper, the following results emerge from the two tables:
() inflation had been I(0) in the interwar period, whereas it has been I(1) after
World War II.
() The monetary base had been I(1) in the interwar period, whereas it had been
trend-stationary in the post-WWII years. The latter result is robust to considering
either M0, or M0 per capita.14
() For all other series, the null of a unit root cannot be rejected.15
() Finally, for all series, and for either period, tests in differences without a
time trend strongly reject the null of a unit root. This is crucial because a necessary
condition for performing Johansen’s tests is that the series under investigation do
contain a unit root, but that their order of integration is not greater than one.
Both () and () justify our choice of performing the analysis by sub-sample,
12For the interwar period, the series for population is only available at the annual frequency.
13For the post-WWII period we ignore the M1 multiplier since Benati and Ireland’s (2017) analysis
suggests that shocks to this variable played a negligible role in post-WWII macroeconomic dynamics.
14Including the period since 2008Q3 the null of a unit root in the monetary base cannot be rejected.
The problem with doing this, however, is that the explosion in the base associated with quantitative
easing policies suggests that considering the period since 2008Q3 together with the previous one is
incorrect.
15For M2 velocity in the interwar period evidence is mixed, with a unit root being rejected only
for  equal to either 9 or 12. In this case, we regard we regard the null of a unit root as not having
been convincingly rejected, and in what follows we will therefore consider this series as I(1).
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rather than for the joint sample 1919-2007 based on annual data.
Table 1c reports the corresponding evidence for Canada for the period 1926-
2006.16 Due to the paucity of data at frequencies higher than annual for the period
before 1961, we are here working with annual data (Appendix B.2 contains an alter-
native set of results based on quarterly data for the period 1961Q1-2006Q4). The null
of unit root cannot be rejected for any series, with the partial exception of inflation
and consumption per capita. In either case we regard we regard the null of a unit
root as not having been convincingly rejected, and in what follows we will therefore
consider both series as I(1).
2.2 Cointegration tests
Tables 2a and 2b report results from Johansen’s cointegration tests for the United
States, whereas Table 2c reports the corresponding results for Canada. In all cases we
report results for both the two main systems we will work with (featuring, respectively,
either the velocities of M1 and M2-M1, or the velocity of M2) and for smaller sub-
systems featuring the short-term nominal rate and the velocity of either M1, M2-
M1, or M2. For the post-WWII period, the two larger systems feature, beyond the
velocity series, the logarithms of real GDP and consumption per capita, the multiplier
of M2-M1, inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year government
bond yield. On the other hand, we do not include the monetary base because, as
discussed in the previous sub-section, it has clearly been trend-stationary over the
sample period. For the interwar period they feature, beyond the velocity series, the
logarithms of sales, industrial production, M0, the CPI, (1+), and (+), the New
York FED discount rate,17 and the high-grade bond rate,18 a long-term interest rate.
For the United States during the interwar period we also consider more flexible money
demand specifications not imposing unitary income (or, to be more precise, industrial
production) elasticity. The key reason for also considering these smaller systems is in
order to test for the presence of stable long-run money demand relationships.
Following BLNW (2018), we bootstrap the tests19 via the procedure proposed by
Cavaliere et al. (2012; henceforth, CRT). In a nutshell, CRT’s procedure is based
on the notion of computing critical and p-values by bootstrapping the model which
is relevant under the null hypothesis.20 All of the technical details can be found in
16As discussed in the data appendix, we end the sample period in 2006 because of changes in the
definitions of monetary aggregates which make it impossible to meaningfully link series corresponding
to alternative definitions.
17The 3-month Treasury bill rate is only available starting from 1934.
18 ‘Index of Yields of High Grade Public Utility Bonds for United States’.
19The rationale for bootstrapping critical and p-values for Johansen’s tests was provided by Jo-
hansen (2002) himself, who showed how, in small samples, trace and maximum eigenvalue tests
based on asymptotic critical values typically tend to perform poorly.
20This means that for tests of the null of no cointegration against the alternative of one or more
cointegrating vectors the model which is being bootstrapped is a simple, non-cointegrated VAR
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Table 2a United States, 1959Q1-2008Q3: Results from Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace tests of the null of no cointegration against the
alternative of h or more cointegrating vectors:
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
3-month Treasury bill rate and
M1 velocity 20.475 (0.043)
M2 velocity 13.176 (0.349)
velocity of M2-M1 13.013 (0.325)
8-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 267.453 (0.001) 187.933 (0.000) 115.078 (0.003) 68.639 (0.022)
7-variables system with M2 velocity 169.346 (0.096) 108.688 (0.059) 66.178 (0.085) 36.149 (0.194)
Maximum eigenvalue tests of h
versus h+1 cointegrating vectors:
0 versus 1 1 versus 2 2 versus 3 3 versus 4
3-month Treasury bill rate and
M1 velocity 15.557 (0.069)
M2 velocity 11.913 (0.274)
velocity of M2-M1 11.152 (0.292)
8-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 79.520 (0.112) 72.855 (0.001) 46.439 (0.040) 32.044 (0.195)
7-variables system with M2 velocity 60.659 (0.261) 42.509 (0.081) 30.030 (0.247) —
 Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications, based on Cavaliere et al.’s (2012) methodology.
Table 2b United States, January 1919-November 1941: Results from Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace tests of the null of no cointegration against the
alternative of h or more cointegrating vectors:
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5
New York FED discount rate and
M1 velocity 11.867 (0.310)
M2 velocity 13.876 (0.393)
velocity of M2-M1 11.207 (0.632)
log industrial production, and log real M1 31.107 (0.098)
log industrial production, and log real M2 24.755 (0.325)
log industrial production, and log real M2-M1 32.656 (0.614)
10-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 446.633 (0.000) 318.473 (0.000) 227.456 (0.000) 162.230 (0.000) 111.194 (0.000)
9-variables system with M2 velocity 386.210 (0.000) 171.377 (0.000) 112.086 (0.000) 68.686 (0.000) 38.938 ( 0.004)
Maximum eigenvalue tests of h
versus h+1 cointegrating vectors:
0 versus 1 1 versus 2 2 versus 3 3 versus 4 4 versus 5
New York FED discount rate and
M1 velocity 9.990 (0.285)
M2 velocity 11.220 (0.307)
velocity of M2-M1 8.007 (0.643)
log industrial production, and log real M1 17.411 (0.272)
log industrial production, and log real M2 17.775 (0.256)
log industrial production, and log real M2-M1 20.037 (0.536)
10-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 128.160 (0.002) 91.017 (3.0e-4) 65.226 (0.013) 51.036 (0.087) 38.383 (0.268)
9-variables system with M2 velocity 132.440 (1.0e-4) 82.394 (3.0e-4) 59.290 (0.012) 43.400 (0.110) —
 Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications, based on Cavaliere et al.’s (2012) methodology.
Table 2c Canada, 1926-2006: Results from Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace tests of the null of no cointegration against the
alternative of h or more cointegrating vectors:
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Bank of Canada rate and
M1 velocity 23.244 (0.015)
M2 velocity 11.802 (0.369)
velocity of M2-M1 12.121 (0.338)
6-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 129.446 (0.009) 82.102 (0.010) 41.597 (0.108)
5-variables system with M2 velocity 92.983 (0.009) 46.278 (0.064) 13.445 (0.843)
Maximum eigenvalue tests of h
versus h+1 cointegrating vectors:
0 versus 1 1 versus 2 2 versus 3 3 versus 4
Bank of Canada rate and
M1 velocity 21.714 (0.008)
M2 velocity 7.650 (0.564)
velocity of M2-M1 8.928 (0.425)
6-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 47.344 (0.069) 40.505 (0.053) 26.570 (0.209)
5-variables system with M2 velocity 46.704 (0.010) 32.833 (0.044) 8.570 (0.941)
 Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications, based on Cavaliere et al.’s (2012) methodology.
CRT, which the reader is referred to. We select the VAR lag order as the maximum21
between the lag orders chosen by the Schwartz and the Hannan-Quinn criteria22 for
the VAR in levels, for a maximum allowed lag order of  = 12 for the interwar period,
and  = 4 for the post-WWII one.
As for the post-WWII period, the following results emerge from Table 2a:
() in line with BLNW (2018), M1 velocity is cointegrated with the 3-month
Treasury bill rate, thus pointing towards the presence of a stable long-run demand
for M1.
() On the other hand, in line with Altermatt (2018), it is not possible to reject
the null of no cointegration between the 3-month Treasury bill rate and M2 velocity.
(As she stresses there, in stark contrast to BLNW’s (2018) results for M1, absence
of cointegration between M2 velocity and a short-term nominal rate is an extraor-
dinarily robust result, holding for nearly all countries and sample periods since the
XIX century.) This, together with (), logically suggests that the absence of a stable
long-run demand for M2 in the post-WWII United States originates from permanent
velocity shocks specific to the M2-M1 component. Indeed, as Table 2a shows, lack of
cointegration with the short rate also pertains to the velocity of M2-M1.
() As for the two larger systems, we adopt a conservative approach, and we
take the identified number of cointegration vectors to be the smaller between those
identified by the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests, respectively. This points to
three cointegration vectors for the system featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-M1,
and two for the system featuring the velocity of M2. For either system, basic economic
logic suggests that two cointegration vectors pertain to GDP and consumption, and to
the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-year government bond yield, respectively.
By the same token, as for the system featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-M1, both
basic economic logic, and the evidence of cointegration between M1 velocity and the
3-month Treasury bill rate, suggest that the the third cointegration vector pertains
to these two series.
Turning to the interwar period, for the reason we mentioned in the previous sub-
section the evidence from cointegration tests should be taken, once again, with a pinch
of salt. At face value, however, the results in Table 2b point towards the presence
of four cointegration vectors in the baseline, 10-variables system we will work with
in Section 3.2, featuring the New York FED discount rate and the high grade bond
rate; the velocities of M1 and M2-M1; and the logarithms of the CPI, the monetary
in differences. For the maximum eigenvalue tests of h versus h+1 cointegrating vectors, on the
other hand, the model which ought to be bootstrapped is the VECM estimated under the null of h
cointegrating vectors.
21We consider the maximum between the lag orders chosen by the SIC and HQ criteria because
the risk associated with selecting a lag order smaller than the true one (model mis-specification) is
more serious than the one resulting from choosing a lag order greater than the true one (over-fitting).
22On the other hand, we do not consider the Akaike Information Criterion since, as discussed
(e.g.) by Luetkepohl (1991), for systems featuring I(1) series the AIC is an inconsistent lag selection
criterion, in the sense of not choosing the correct lag order asymptotically.
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base, industrial production, sales, (1+), and (+). As for smaller systems featuring
the New York FED discount rate and the velocity of either M1, M2, or M2-M1; or
the New York FED discount rate, log industrial production, and the logarithm of
either real M1, real M2, or real M2-M1, there is essentially no evidence of a stable
long-run demand for either of the three monetary aggregates. In line with Engle and
Granger (1987), and with the Monte Carlo evidence reported by BLNW (2018), a
possible interpretation of these results is however that they simply reflect the short
sample period and, possibly, the high persistence of the cointegration residual.23 For
example, based on the same data used herein, Benati and Ireland (2017) detect
strong evidence of cointegration between the New York FED discount rate and the
logarithms of the CPI, M1, and industrial production based on the longer period
January 1919-December 1960.
Finally, as for Canada the following findings emerge from Table 2c:
() in line with the results for the post-WWII United States, there is very strong
evidence of cointegration between the Bank of Canada rate and M1 velocity, whereas
there is no evidence of cointegration with either M2 velocity, or the velocity or M2-
M1. Once again, this points towards the presence of a stable long-run demand for
M1, and of permanent velocity shocks specific to M2-M1 which prevent cointegration
between the velocities of either M2-M1, or M2, and the short rate.
() As for the larger systems, we detect two cointegration vectors for both the
system featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-M1, and the one featuring the velocity
of M2.
We now turn to an analysis based on cointegrated structural VARs.
3 Evidence for the United States
We start by discussing the evidence for the post-WWII period, and we then turn to
the interwar years, for which, as mentioned, the lack of official high-frequency data
for either GDP or GNP makes our results less reliable.
3.1 The post-WWII period
We estimate either the baseline 8-variables system featuring the velocities of M1 and
M2-M1, or the alternative 7-variables system featuring the velocity of M2, based on
Johansen’s estimator of the VECM, imposing in estimation three and, respectively,
two cointegration vectors. We characterize the uncertainty around all estimated ob-
jects of interest by bootstrapping the estimated cointegrated VAR as in CRT (2012),
23For example, Hansen (1999) ‘grid bootstrap’ estimates of the sum of the autoregressive coef-
ficients in AR() representations for the ‘candidate cointegration residual’ (defined as in BLNW,
2018), are equal to (bootstrapped 90%-coverage confidence interval in parentheses) 0.96 [0.94; 0.99]
for the system featuring the 3-month Treasury bill rate and M1 velocity; and to 0.97 [0.95; 0.99] and
to 0.98 [0.97; 1.00] for the corresponding systems featuring the velocities of M2 and of M2-M1.
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and imposing upon the bootstrapped data the same identifying restrictions we impose
upon the actual data.
3.1.1 Identification of the structural disturbances
We identify four permanent shocks by imposing restrictions on the matrix of the
shocks’ long-run impacts.
The first three shocks are the same which had been identified by King, Plosser,
Stock, and Watson (1991) in the expanded, six-variables system including nominal
variables of the second part of the paper (see pages 831-836): a ‘balanced-growth
shock’, a ‘neutral inflation shock’, and a ‘real interest-rate shock’.
(1) We start by identifying a permanent shock to GDP and consumption per capita
(

 ), by imposing the restriction that it is the only shock affecting consumption per
capita in the infinite long run. We focus on consumption, rather than GDP, in order
to obtain a better identification of the shock. This choice is motivated by the evidence
reported, e.g., by Cochrane (1994), of consumption being, to a first approximation,
the permanent component of GDP, which is an obvious time-series implication of the
permanent income hypothesis under rational expectations, as first outlined by Hall
(1978).
(2) Conditional on having identified 

 , we identify a residual permanent infla-
tion shock ( ), as the only other shock permanently impacting upon inflation in
the infinite long run. Since, as we will see, the permanent GDP shock has a sta-
tistically insignificant long-run impact on inflation,  is, in fact, the only shock
permanently impacting upon inflation in the infinite long run. In Appendix B we
report results from an alternative identification scheme in which we aim at providing
a more structural interpretation of  , by identifying a permanent shock to the mul-
tiplier of M2-M1, which turns out to be the main driver of the unit root in inflation.
To anticipate, results are in line with those produced by the scheme we are using
herein. Our preference for King et al.’s (1991) scheme, in which no (more) structural
interpretation of the unit root in inflation is provided, is motivated by the fact that it
represents the simplest possible way of implementing, within a structural VAR con-
text, the argument we laid out in Section 1.1: Failure to distinguish betweeen M1 and
M2-M1 automatically causes the permanent portfolio reallocations between the two
aggregates associated with the Great Inflation episode to be largely misinterpreted
as permanent M2 velocity shocks. As we will see, this is indeed what evidence based
on King et al.’s (1991) scheme suggests.
(3) Conditional on having identified 

 and 

 , we identify a residual permanent
shock to the nominal interest rate ( ), as the only other shock permanently impacting
upon the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the infinite long run. This shock has the natural
interpretation of a shock to the real rate.
Finally, (4) beyond the three shocks identified by King et al. (1991), we identify a
residual permanent shock to the velocity of either M2-M1, or M2, as the only other
12
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Figure 3  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Impulse-response functions to the permanent shocks, 
             with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure 4  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
             the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shock permanently impacting upon the relevant velocity series in the infinite long
run. The importance of this shock at driving the relevant velocity series–in terms of
the fraction of its FEV it explains–is a main objective of our investigation.
We now turn to the evidence.
3.1.2 Evidence
Figures 3 to 5 show, based on the system featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-M1,
the impulse-response functions (IRFs) to the four shocks; the fractions of FEV of the
series they explain; and the series’ counterfactual paths obtained by killing off one
shock at a time (here we do not show results for the permanent GDP shock because
they are not especially interesting). Figure 6 shows the fractions of FEV of the series
explained by any of the four shocks based on the system featuring the velocity of M2.
Impulse-response functions Most of the IRFs are not especially interesting, as
they simply exhibit the pattern we would expect ex ante. Permanent GDP shocks,
for example, have a positive and statistically significant impact on both GDP and
consumption, and a statistically insignificant impact on all other series.
The most interesting results pertain to the permanent inflation shocks, which
cause a permanent increase in inflation itself; as a consequence of this they cause, by
the Fisher effect, permanent increases in both the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the
10-year bond yield which are borderline significant at the 90 per cent level, but are
clearly significant at the 68 per cent level; they cause a strongly statistically signifi-
cant increase in the multiplier of M2-M1; and–because of the portfolio reallocation
mechanism illustrated in Figure 2–they therefore cause a permanent increase in M1
velocity, and a permanent decrease in the velocity of M2-M1. Finally, permanent in-
flation shocks also have, by construction, no long-run impact on consumption. As
for the long-run impact on GDP, it is, strictly speaking, statistically significant, but
it is quantitatively negligible. Further, as shown in Figure 4 these shocks explain es-
sentially nothing of the FEV of GDP (and consumption) at any horizon, so that, all
considered, the finding of a very small statistically significant impact of these shocks
on GDP should be heavily discounted. The reason for this is that, as discussed e.g.
by Canova and Paustian (2011), reliably estimating the IRFs to ‘small’ shocks–i.e.,
to shocks which explain little-to-nothing of the variance of the data–is typically
difficult.
As expected, the real interest rate shock has a positive and statistically significant
impact on both nominal interest rates. As for the long-run impact on the multiplier
and the two velocity series, it is almost uniformly insignificant, either clearly, as in
the case of the velocity of M2-M1, or in a borderline fashion, for the other two series
at long horizons. As shown in Figure 4, however, these shocks explain little-to-nil of
the FEV of the three series at long horizons, so that, based on Canova and Paustian’s
previously mentioned argument, the results for the IRFs should be discounted.
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Finally, the residual permanent shock to the velocity of M2-M1 has a statistically
significant impact only on the velocity series itself.
Fractions of forecast error variance Turning to the fractions of FEV, the most
important result in Figure 4 pertains to the permanent inflation shocks, which explain
the bulk of the FEV of inflation itself at long horizons; explain about one-fifth of the
long-horizon FEV of the 3-month Treasury bill rate; and explain the dominant portion
of both M1 velocity, and especially the velocity of M2-M1 and the multiplier of M2-
M1. By contrast, residual shocks to the velocity of M2-M1 explain virtually nothing of
all series–in particular, of velocity itself. The contrast with the corresponding set of
results produced by the system featuring M2 velocity–instead of the velocities of M1
and M2-M1–is stark: As the fourth panel in the fourth row of Figure 6 shows, in this
case the SVAR ‘identifies’ a large role for shocks to M2 velocity, which explain almost
everything of the long-horizon FEV of M2 velocity itself. As previously mentioned,
the explanation for this result is straightforward: Since, as documented in Figure 3,
inflation shocks have opposite effects on the velocities of M1, and of M2-M1, failure
to split M2 into its two components logically implies that the impact of these shocks
will largely cancel out in the aggregate. As a result, this spuriously creates the need
for another ‘shock’ in order to explain its long-horizon dynamics. Another way of
putting this is that failure to split M2 into M1, and M2-M1, automatically causes a
sizeable portion of the permanent inflation shocks lagely associated with the Great
Inflation episode to be erroneously classified as shocks to M2 velocity.
These results, together with those pertaining to the IRFs in Figure 3, provide an
interpretation of shifts in U.S. money velocity over the post-WWII period in which
permanent inflation shocks caused, via the Fisher effect, permanent fluctuations in
nominal interest rates. This, in turn, triggered permanent portfolio reallocations, first
out of M1 and into M2-M1, and subsequently, with the Volcker disinflation, in the
opposite direction, thus causing first an increase, and then a decrease in M1 velocity,
and the opposite pattern of variation in the velocity of M2-M1.
As for other disturbances, permanent GDP shocks explain, as expected, essentially
all of the long-horizon FEV of consumption, and–again as expected–a dominant,
but slightly smaller fraction of the FEV of GDP. Finally, shocks to the real rate have
played an important role only for the 3-month Treasury bill rate24 and the 10-year
bond yield.
Counterfactual simulations Evidence from counterfactual simulations in which
we ‘kill off’ one shock at a time provide additional validation to the previously dis-
cussed interpretation of post-WWII fluctuations in U.S. money velocity. Whereas,
absent the residual shocks to the velocity of M2-M1, essentially nothing would have
24This result is the same as King et al.’s (1991).
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Figure 5  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Counterfactual simulations killing off 
             permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure 6  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
             the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
changed compared to the actual historical outcomes,25 eliminating the inflation shocks
would have produced dramatic changes in all series except–as is logically to be
expected–GDP and consumption. Specifically, absent such shocks, the Great Infla-
tion would not have taken place, and both inflation and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
would have exhibited a flat overall trend, although with highly persistent transitory
fluctuations. Because of this, M1 velocity and the multiplier of M2-M1 would also
have exhibited much less variation, and they would have been broadly flat, whereas
the velocity of M2-M1 would have exhibited a steady increase over the entire sample
period, as opposed to its U-shaped actual historical evolution.
We now turn to the interwar period.
3.2 The period January 1919-November 1941
As before, we estimate either the baseline 10-variables system featuring the velocities
of M1 and M2-M1, or the corresponding 9-variables system featuring M2 velocity,
based on Johansen’s estimator of the VECM, imposing in estimation four and re-
spectively three cointegration vectors. In what follows we only report and discuss
results based on the larger system because, as we will see, the velocities of M1 and
M2-M1 co-moved positively–rather than negatively, as in the post-WWII period–
in response to the structural disturbances driving the permanent component of the
New York FED’s discount rate. As a result, the system featuring M2 velocity pro-
duces qualitatively the same results.26 We characterize the uncertainty around all
estimated objects of interest by bootstrapping the estimated cointegrated VAR as in
CRT (2012), and imposing upon the bootstrapped data the same identifying restric-
tions we impose upon the actual data.
3.2.1 Identification of the structural disturbances
We identify six permanent shocks by imposing restrictions on the matrix of the shocks’
long-run impacts.
(1) We start by identifying a permanent shock to the currency/deposits ratio, 
( ), and a permanent shock to the reserves/deposits ratio,  (

 ), by imposing the
restrictions that ()  is the only shock which is allowed to have a permanent impact
on ln(1+), and ()  is the only other shock, beyond 

 , which is allowed to have
a permanent impact on ln(+).
(2) Conditional on having identified  and 

 , we then identify the permanent
shocks to sales (), as the only other shock having a permanent impact on sales.
27
25As mentioned, the counterfactual paths obtained by killing off permanent GDP shocks are even
closer to the actual historical paths, to the point that they are essentially indistinguishable. Because
of this we do not report them, but they are available upon request.
26The results produced by the 9-variables system featuring M2 velocity are reported in the online
appendix.
27We use sales as a proxy for consumption, which is unavailable at a frequency higher than annual.
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We identify this disturbance after having previously identified the shocks to  and
 because, given the peculiarity of the Great Depression episode, we want to allow
for the possibility that shocks to either the currency/deposits or the reserve/deposits
ratio–i.e., the two key disturbances which, historically, had driven the Depression–
may have had a permanent impact on consumption and output levels (here proxied
by sales and industrial production). This choice is, in our own view, not only easy
to rationalize, but in fact a logical one: Just to mention a single piece of supporting
evidence, it is well known that by the time Franklin D. Roosevelt became President,
in March 1933, about one-third of the U.S. banking system had gone bankrupt (to
the point that he introduced a week-long banking holiday in order to stabilize the
system). So the notion that the key shocks driving the Depression– and 

–may
have had a permanent impact on output and consumption levels not only is not
far-fetched, but it is, in fact, a logical one.
(3) Conditional on having identified  , 

 , and 

 , we then identify a residual
permanent shock to the monetary base (0 ), as the only other shock having a per-
manent impact on M0. The fact that we identify this shock after disturbances to ,
, and sales implies that any of these three disturbances is allowed to impact upon
the monetary base. As for sales, since they here proxy for consumption, the reason is
obvious: Any shock permanently impacting upon consumption, and therefore GDP,
should be expected to also permanently impact M0 in the same direction. As for
 and , the rationale is that, in the face of contractionary shocks to either  or
–and therefore contractionary shocks to the M1 multiplier–it can be reasonably
expected that the Fed might try to counteract the recessionary impact on the econ-
omy by expanding the monetary base. At the same time, we also want to allow for
autonomous variation in M0. The rationale for this is not only the strict conceptual
one about the sheer implausibility that the monetary base might have exhibited no
random, autonomous permanent variation over the sample period. Rather, Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) discusses several instances in which, during those years, the base
was affected by manifestly exogenous disturbances unrelated to variation in  and .28
(4) Conditional on having identified  , 

 , 

 , and 
0
 , we then identify a residual
permanent shock to the New York FED discount rate ( ), as the only other shock
having a permanent impact on the discount rate.
(5) Finally, conditional on having identified the previous five shocks, we identify
a residual permanent shock to the velocity of M2-M1 (
2−1
 ).
We now turn to discussing the evidence. As already stressed, it is important to
keep in mind that, because of the previously discussed limitations pertaining to the
quality of interwar data, all of these results should be taken with some caution.
28The starkest example is provided by the large gold inflows, mainly from Britain, during the
period of U.S. neutrality from September 1939 through November 1941, which as discussed by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 551) led to a cumulative 29 percent increase in both the monetary
base and broader monetary aggregates and a coincident 23 increase in the wholesale price level,
translating into an inflation rate of 9 percent per year.
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Figure 7  United States, January 1919-November 1941: Impulse-response functions to the permanent 
             shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
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Figure 8  United States, January 1919-November 1941: Fractions of forecast error variance explained 
             by either of the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Evidence
Impulse-response functions Starting from the IRFs, the main finding in Figure 7
is that–in stark contrast to the post-WWII period–all disturbances induce qualita-
tively the same response in the velocity of either M1 or M2-M1. This logically implies
that, different from the latter period, failure to split M2 into its M1 and non-M1
portions does not lead to any distortion of the inference pertaining to the role played
by velocity shocks: Quite simply, rather than largely cancelling out in the aggregate,
the responses of the two velocity series to any of the shocks get added up, so that
focusing on M2 velocity produces, qualitatively, the same results (this additional set
of results is reported in the online appendix).
Entering into details, shocks to the currency/deposits ratio have a negative perma-
nent impact on both sales and industrial production, thus providing support to our
previous conjecture that some of the key disturbances which had historically driven
the Great Depression episode had a permanent impact on output levels. By the same
token, these shocks are estimated to have had a negative permanent impact on the
CPI. This, together with the fact that shocks to  explain dominant portions of the
FEV of either sales, industrial production, or the CPI (see the first row of Figure 8),
point towards these disturbances having been a key driver of the Great Depression
and of the associated deflation. On the other hand, shocks to the currency/deposits
ratio have had statistically insignificant impacts on all other series (in the case of the
two velocity series, insignificance at the 90 per cent level is borderline, whereas both
impacts are clearly negative at the one standard deviation level of significance). In
particular, the monetary base does not react in a statistically significant way to shocks
to the currency/deposits ratio, thus suggesting that, during the interwar period, the
FED did not react to contractionary shocks to .
Shocks to the reserve/deposits ratio, on the other hand, triggered a strong and
statistically significant response in the monetary base, thus suggesting that the FED
attempted to cushion the blow for the economy by expanding M0. This is the most
logical explanation for the fact that–different from shocks to –these disturbances
only had a temporary negative impact on either sales, industrial production, or the
CPI. Finally, the impact on either velocity series is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, being transitory for M2-M1, and permanent for M1.
The residual permanent shocks to sales cause, as expected, permanent increases
in industrial production and the monetary base. They are also estimated to cause an
increase in the velocity of M2-M1, and a borderline statistically insignificant increase
in M1 velocity. The residual shocks to the monetary base have no statistically signif-
icant impact on anything other than the base itself at any horizon. A caveat to these
results is that these shocks are estimated to explain essentially nothing of all series
(other than the base itself) at all horizons, so that everything pertaining to these
shocks should be taken with some caution. The residual shock to the discount rate
causes a highly statistically significant increase in either of the two velocity series,
and a puzzling increase in industrial production, which is, possibly, just a figment of
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the idiosyncratic nature of the interwar period. Finally, the residual shocks to the
velocity of M2-M1 are transitory for all series, including the velocity of M2-M1 itself.
Fractions of forecast error variance Turning to the fractions of FEV, the most
important result emerging from Figure 8 pertains to the dominant role played by
shocks to either the currency/deposits or the reserves/deposits ratio in driving the
velocities of both M1 and M2-M1: Considered together, the two shocks explain about
half of the FEV of M1 velocity, and 40-45 per cent of the FEV of the velocity of M2-
M1, at all horizons. By contrast, the residual shock to the velocity of M2-M1 explains
virtually nothing of all series–including velocity itself–with the single exception of
the long-term rate, thus showing that, in fact, this disturbance is a residual shock to
the long rate. Shocks to the monetary base explain little of the FEV of all series,
with the single exception of the base itself at short-to-medium horizons. This points
towards the long-horizon dynamics of the base as being driven, to a dominant extent,
by other exogenous influences, first and foremost shocks to the reserves/deposits ratio.
Finally, permanent shocks to sales explain one fourth to one fifth of the long-horizon
FEV of sales themselves, but other than that they play a minor to begligible role for
all other series.
We now discuss the evidence for Canada.
4 Evidence for Canada
Figures 9 to 12 show, for Canada for the period 1926-2006, evidence from cointegrated
structural VARs featuring either the velocities of M1 and M2-M1, or the velocity of
M2. We identify three shocks; () a permanent consumption (i.e., GDP) shock, () a
residual permanent shock to the Bank of Canada’s discount rate, and () a residual
permanent shock to the velocity of either M2-M1, or M2. The IRFs reported in Figure
9 do not require any particular comment, as they are uniformly in line with what we
should expect, with (e.g.) the permanent GDP shock only permanently impacting
upon GDP and consumption; the residual permanent interest rate shock having no
impact on GDP and consumption, and causing a statistically significant increase in
the Bank rate, the long rate, and M1 velocity, and a decrease in the velocity of M2-
M1; and the residual shock to the velocity of M2-M1 only permanently impacting
upon velocity itself. A comparison between Figures 10 and 12 shows that based on
either system, velocity shocks are estimated to have played a uniformly minor role,
although, in line with the the evidence for the post-WWI United States, failure to split
M2 into M1 and M2-M1 leads, once again, to a larger role for velocity shocks at long
horizons. Finally, eliminating permanent interest rate shocks produces counterfactual
paths which are uniformly significantly flatter then the actual historical series for the
discount rate, the long rate, and M1 velocity, whereas the impact is more subdued
for the velocity of M2-M1.
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Figure 9  Canada, 1926-2006: Impulse-response functions to the permanent shocks, 
             with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
 
 
 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10  Canada, 1926-2006: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either 
               of the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
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Figure 11  Canada, 1926-2006: Counterfactual simulations killing off permanent 
               interest rate shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
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Figure 12  Canada, 1926-2006: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either 
               of the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
 
 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions
Since World War I, in the United States permanent interest rate shocks have driven
nearly all of the fluctuations of M1 velocity (which is cointegrated with the short
rate), and most of the movements in the velocity of the M2-M1 aggregate. Velocity
shocks specific to M2-M1 have played a minor role.
Failure to distinguish between M1 and M2-M1 causes a dramatic distortion of the
inference, erroneously pointing towards a dominant role for M2 velocity shocks: In
fact, since interest rate shocks have an opposite effect on the velocity of M1 and M2-
M1, failure to split M2 into its two components causes the shocks’ impacts to largely
cancel out in the aggregate, thus spuriously creating the need for another shock in
order to explain the dynamics of M2 velocity.
Our evidence suggests that most of the fluctuations in U.S. money velocity since
World War I have not been caused by exogenous velocity shocks, and they have
rather originated from the instability of U.S. post-Gold Standard monetary regimes
(i.e., they have been an empirical manifestation of the Lucas critique). By introducing
a unit root in inflation–and therefore in interest rates–these regimes have caused
fluctuations in money velocity which, otherwise, would have not been there.
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A The Data
A.1 Austria
An annual series for the policy rate of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austria’s
central bank), available for the period 1818-1998, is from the central bank’s website.
A.2 Canada
Annual series for the period 1926-2006 An annual series for nominal GDP,
available since 1870, has been constructed by linking the Urquhart series (available
from Statistics Canada, which is Canada’s national statistical agency), for the period
1870-1924; series 0380-0515, v96392559 (1.1) from Statistics Canada, for the period
1925-1980; and series 0384-0038, v62787311 (1.2.38) from Statistics Canada, for the
period 1981-2013. A series for the official discount rate, available since 1926, has
been constructed as follows. Since 1934, when the Bank of Canada was created, it is
simply the official bank rate (‘Taux Officiel d’Escompte’) from the Bank of Canada’s
website. Before that, we use the Advance Rate, which had been set by the Treasury
Department for the discounting of bills, from Table 6.1 of Shearer and Clark (1984).
To be precise, Shearer and Clark (1984) do not provide the actual time series for the
Advance Rate, but rather the dates at which the rate had been changed (starting
from August 22, 1914), together with the new value of the rate prevailing starting
from that date. Based on this information, we constructed a daily series for the rate
starting on January 1, 1915 via a straightforward MATLAB program, and we then
converted the series to the annual frequency by taking annual averages. Monthly
series for M1 and M2 starting in January 1872 are from Metcalf, Redish, and Shearer
(1996), and they have been extended as follows. As for M2, we use the series from
Metcalf et al. (1996) until December 1967. Then, starting from January 1968, we use
the series labelled as ‘M2 (net) (currency outside banks, chartered bank demand and
notice deposits, chartered bank personal term deposits, adjustments to M2 (net),
v37198’ from Statistics Canada. As for M1, we use the series from Metcalf et al.
(1996) until December 1952; after that, we link it via splicing to the series labelled
as ‘Currency and demand deposits, M1 (x 1,000,000), v37213’ until November 1981
from Statistics Canada; finally, from December 1981 until December 2006, we use the
series from Statistics Canada labelled as ‘M1 (net) (currency outside banks, chartered
bank demand deposits, adjustments to M1 (continuity adjustments and inter-bank
demand deposits) (x 1,000,000), v37200’. An important point to stress is that over the
periods of overlapping, the three series are near-identical (up to a scale factor), which
justifies their linking. On the other hand, for the period after December 2006 we were
not able to find an M1 series which could be reliably linked to the one we use for
the period December 1981-December 2006 (over the last several decades, Canada’s
monetary aggregates have undergone a number of redefinitions, which complicates
the task of constructing consistent long-run series for either of them). As a result,
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we decided to end the sample period in 2006. We convert the monthly series to the
annual frequency by taking simple annual averages.
Quarterly series for the period 1961Q1-2006Q4 The monthly series for M1
and M2 are the same discussed in the previous section, and they have been converted
to the quarterly frequency by taking simple quarterly averages. A series for the
monetary base, available since January 1955, is from the Bank of Canada (Table 176-
0020: Currency outside banks and chartered bank deposits, monthly average, dollars x
1,000,000). Either M0, M1, or M2 have been seasonally adjusted via ARIMA X-12, as
implemented in EViews, and they have been converted to the quarterly frequency by
taking averages within the quarter. A quarterly series for population since 1960Q1
is from Ohanian and Raffo (2011), and it has been updated based on the series
‘Working Age Population: Aged 15-64: All Persons for CanadaPersons, Quarterly,
Seasonally Adjusted’ (acronym is LFWA64TTCAQ647S) from the St. Louis FED’s
website. Monthly series for the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-year government
bond yield are from Statistics Canada. They have been converted to the quarterly
frequency by taking averages within the quarter. Quarterly seasonally adjusted series
for nominal and real GDP, real consumption, and the GDP deflator are from Statistics
Canada.
A.3 Finland
A series for Bank of Finland’s monetary policy rate (labelled as the ‘Base rate’),
available since January 1867, is from Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, i.e., Finland’s
central bank (henceforth, Suomen Pankki). To be precise, Suomen Pankki does not
provides the actual time series for the base rate, but rather the dates at which the
rate had been changed (starting from January 1, 1867), together with the new
value of the base rate prevailing starting from that date. Based on this information,
we constructed a daily series for the base rate starting on January 1, 1867 via a
straightforward MATLAB program, and we then converted the series to the annual
frequency by taking annual averages.
A.4 France
An annual series for the Banque de France’s discount rate for the period 1800-1989 is
from Tables 27 and 63 of Homer and Sylla (2005). An annual series for the 3-month
Treasury bill rate for the period since 1971 is from the St. Louis FED’s website
(acronym is INTGSTFRM193N).
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A.5 Japan
A monthly series for the Bank of Japan’s (henceforth, BoJ ) discount rate, available
since January 1883, is from the BoJ ’s long-run historical statistics, which are available
at its website (the series is labelled as: ‘BJ’MADR1M: The Basic Discount Rate and
Basic Loan Rate’). The series has been converted to the annual frequency by taking
annual averages.
A.6 Norway
A series for the central bank’s official discount rate, available since 1819, is from the
Historical Statistics of Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank), which are available at
its website.
A.7 Spain
An annual series for the official discount rate of the Banco de Espana (Spain’s central
bank, henceforth, BdE), available for the period 1930-1989, is from Table 74, pp. 541-
542, of Homer and Sylla (2005).
A.8 Sweden
An annual series for the Riksbank ’s discount rate available for the period 1856-1989
is from Tables 35 and 72 of Homer and Sylla (2005, p. 268, and pp. 531-533,
respectively).
A.9 United Kingdom
The Bank of England ’s official discount rate is from version 2.3 of the Bank of Eng-
land ’s dataset of long-run historical statistics, which is available from the Bank of
England ’s website (the Excel spreadsheet is called threecenturies_v2.3.xlsx; hence-
forth, TC). The first version of the dataset was discussed in detail in Hills and Dims-
dale (2010).
A.10 United States
The annual series for the short-term nominal rate since 1890 The series for
the 3-month Treasury Bill since 1915 rate is from Benati et al. (2018). The series’
original source is the Economic Report of the President. For the period 1890-1914,
we use the series for the nominal rate on stock exchange loans (series Cj1226), linked
to the series for bankers’ acceptances rate (series Cj1230).
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Monthly series for the period January 1919-December 1960 Seasonally ad-
justed series for currency held by the public, demand deposits, bank reserves, and
M2 are from Tables A.1 and A.2 of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). We compute
high-powered (i.e., base) money as the sum of currency held by the public and bank
reserves. A seasonally adjusted series for the industrial production index is from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A seasonally adjusted series for
the CPI has been constructed by linking the seasonally adjusted CPI series for all
urban consumers, all items (acronym is CPIAUCSL) from the U.S. Department of
Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is available since January 1947, to the
CPI all items series (NBER series 04128 from NBER Historical database), which is,
originally, seasonally unadjusted, and we seasonally adjusted via ARIMA X-12. A
seasonally unadjusted series for the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is from the NBER Historical database (acronym is M13009USM156NNBR).
The seasonally unadjusted series for Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield is
Moody’s. A seasonally unadjusted series for the index of yields of high grade public
utility bonds for United States is from the NBER Historical database (acronym is
M13025USM156NNBR). A seasonally unadjusted series for department store sales is
from the NBER Historical database (acronym is M06F2BUSM350NNBR), and it has
been seasonally adjusted via ARIMA X-12.
Quarterly series for the period 1959Q1-2008Q3 A monthly seasonally ad-
justed M2 series is from the St. Louis FED’s website (acronym is M2SL). Monthly sea-
sonally unadjusted series for the Federal Funds rate and the 10-year government bond
yield are from the St. Louis FED’s website (acronyms are FEDFUNDS and GS10).
A monthly seasonally unadjusted series for the St. Louis Source Base (SBASENS)
is from the St. Louis Fed’s website. The series has been seasonally adjusted via
ARIMA X-12 as implemented in EViews. A monthly seasonally unadjusted series
for civilian non-institutional population (CNP16OV) is from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. All of the monthly series have been converted to
the quarterly frequency by taking averages within the quarter.
A quarterly seasonally adjusted version of Lucas and Nicolini’s (2015) M1 aggre-
gate has been kindly provided by Juan-Pablo Nicolini. Specifically, the series is equal
to M1SL from the St. Louis FED’s website (converted to the quarterly frequency by
taking averages within the quarter) until 1981Q4, and it is equal to M1SL plus MM-
DAs for the period 1982Q1-2008Q3. As discussed by LucasJr. and Nicolini (2015),
the rationale for including MMDAs (which were introduced in 1982) into M1 is that,
although they have traditionally been classified as part of the M2-M1 component, in
fact, the economic function they perform is very similar to that performed by the
bank deposits which are part of M1. Seasonally adjusted series for real and nominal
GDP (GDPC96 and GDP, respectively) are from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The seasonally adjusted series for real chain-weighted
consumption of non-durables and services have been computed based on the data
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found in Tables 1.1.6, 1.1.6B, 1.1.6C, and 1.1.6D of the National Income and Product
Accounts. A seasonally adjusted chain-type price index series for the gross domestic
product (GDPCTPI) is from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
B The Post-WWII Period: Evidence from Alter-
native Identification Strategies
In this appendix we report results for the post-WWII United States and Canada,
based on alternative identification strategies compared to those we used in the main
text.
B.1 United States
B.1.1 Identification of the structural disturbances
We identify four permanent shocks by imposing the following restrictions on the
matrix of the shocks’ long-run impacts.
(1) As in the main text, we start by identifying a permanent shock to GDP and
consumption per capita (

 ), by imposing the restriction that it is the only shock
affecting consumption per capita in the infinite long run.
(2) Conditional on having identified 

 , we identify a residual permanent shock
to the multiplier of M2-M1 ( ), as the only other shock permanently impacting
upon the multiplier in the infinite long run. Since, as we will see, the permanent
GDP shock () explains essentially nothing of the forecast error variance (FEV) of
the multiplier of M2-M1 at any horizon, and () it has a statistically insignificant
impact on it at all horizons,  is, in fact, the only shock permanently impacting
upon the multiplier in the infinite long run. Our motivation for identifying this shock
is twofold. First, we aim at providing an explicitly monetary interpretation of the
permanent inflation shocks we identified in Section 3.1. In doing this, we are motivated
by evidence, such as that discussed by Lucas (2006, 2014), of a remarkably strong and
stable correlation, over time and across monetary regimes, between the low-frequency
components of inflation and of the rates of growth of alternative monetary aggregates.
Second, in deciding which specific monetary aggregate to focus upon, our choice of
M2-M1–and, in particular, of its multiplier–is motivated by the fact that () since,
as discussed in Section 2.1, M0 has been trend-stationary, as a matter of logic it cannot
possibly have been the source of the permanent variation in post-WWII U.S. inflation;
and () as shown by Benati and Ireland (2017), in the post-WWII United States,
shocks to the M1 multiplier have played a uniformly negligible role across the board.
Our interpretation of the Great Inflation episode, and of the Volcker disinflation, is
therefore that, for a given, trend-stationary path of the monetary base, they had been
caused first by an expansion, and then by a contraction, of the multiplier of M2-M1,
27
that is, of the amount of M2-M1 the financial system creates for a given ‘input’ of
monetary based provided by the central bank. As we will see, this shock explains the
dominant portion of the FEV of the velocities of both M1, and M2-M1, especially at
long horizons.
(3) Conditional on having identified 

 and 

 , we identify a residual permanent
inflation shock ( ), as the only other shock permanently impacting upon inflation
in the infinite long run. The reason for identifying this shock is in order to allow for
the possibility of some additional permanent influence on inflation beyond permanent
monetary shocks.
(4) Conditional on having identified 

 , 

 , and 

 , we identify a residual perma-
nent shock to the nominal interest rate ( ), as the only other shock permanently
impacting upon the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the infinite long run. This shock
has the natural interpretation of a shock to the real rate.
Shocks (1) and (4), together with a ‘quasi reduced-form’ permanent inflation
shock, were the same disturbances originally identified by King, Plosser, Stock, and
Watson (1991) in the largest (i.e., six-variable) system they had considered. Then,
(5) conditional on having identified the previous four disturbances, we identify a
residual permanent shock to the velocity of either M2-M1, or M2, as the only other
shock permanently impacting upon the relevant velocity series in the infinite long
run. The importance of this shock at driving the relevant velocity series–in terms of
the fraction of its FEV it explains–is a main objective of our investigation.
We now turn to the evidence.
B.1.2 Evidence
Figures B.1 to B.3 show, based on the system featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-
M1, the impulse-response functions (IRFs) to the five shocks; the fractions of FEV
of the series they explain; and the series’ counterfactual paths obtained by killing
off one shock at a time (here we do not show results for the permanent GDP shock
because they are not especially interesting). Figure B.4 shows the fractions of FEV
of the series explained by any of the five shocks based on the system featuring the
velocity of M2.
Impulse-response functions Most of the IRFs are not especially interesting, as
they simply exhibit the pattern we would expect ex ante. Permanent GDP shocks,
for example, have a positive and statistically significant impact on both GDP and
consumption, and a statistically insignificant impact on all other series.
The most interesting results pertain to the permanent shocks to the M2-M1 multi-
plier, which cause a permanent increase both in the multiplier itself and, as expected,
in inflation; as a consequence they cause, by the Fisher effect, a permanent increase
in both the 3-month Treasury bill rate and the 10-year bond yield; and–because of
the portfolio reallocation mechanism illustrated in Figure 2–they therefore cause a
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permanent increase in M1 velocity, and a permanent decrease in the velocity of M2-
M1. Finally, permanent shocks to the M2-M1 multiplier also have, by construction,
no long-run impact on consumption, whereas their impact on GDP is borderline sta-
tistically insignificant. Since, as shown in Figure B.2, these shocks explain essentially
nothing of the FEV of GDP (and consumption) at any horizon, this result should
however be heavily discounted.
The residual permanent inflation shock has a statistically significant impact only
on inflation itself, and on the velocity of M2-M1, which it permanently affects nega-
tively.
The real interest rate shock has a positive and statistically significant impact,
as expected, on both nominal interest rates. It also has a positive and statistically
significant impact on M1 velocity, whereas its impact on the velocity of M2-M1 is
insignificant. Finally, it also has, at face value, a statistically significant impact on
GDP, but since this shock explains a compaatively small fraction of its FEV, this
result should be discounted.
Finally, the residual permanent shock to the velocity of M2-M1 has a statistically
significant impact only on the velocity series itself.
Fractions of forecast error variance Turning to the fractions of FEV, the most
important result in Figure B.2 pertains to the shocks to the multiplier of M2-M1,
which explain essentially all of the FEV of the multiplier itself at nearly all horizons;
explain about half of the long-horizon FEV of inflation, thus providing support to
our presumption that low-frequency fluctuations in post-WWII U.S. inflation have
had a monetary origin; explain about one-fourth of the FEV of either nominal rate
at almost all horizons; and explain the dominant portion of both M1 velocity, and
especially the velocity of M2-M1. By contrast, residual shocks to the velocity of M2-
M1 explain virtually nothing of all series–in particular, of velocity itself. The contrast
with the corresponding set of results produced by the system featuring M2 velocity–
instead of the velocities of M1 and M2-M1–is stark: As the fifth panel in the fifth
row of Figure B.4 shows, in this case the SVAR ‘identifies’ a large role for shocks to
M2 velocity, which explain slightly more than 40 per cent of the long-horizon FEV
of M2 velocity itself. As previously mentioned, the explanation for this result is
straightforward: Since, as documented in Figure B.1, shocks to the multiplier of M2-
M1 have opposite effects on the velocities of M1, and of M2-M1, failure to split M2 into
its two components logically implies that the impact of these shocks will largely cancel
out in the aggregate. As a result, since M2 velocity–different from M1 velocity–is
not cointegrated with the short rate (see Table 2a), this spuriously creates the need
for another ‘shock’ in order to explain its long-horizon dynamics. Another way of
putting this is that failure to split M2 into M1, and M2-M1, automatically causes a
sizeable portion of the monetary shocks associated with the unit root component of
post-WWWII U.S. inflation to be erroneously classified as shocks to M2 velocity.
These results, together with those pertaining to the IRFs in Figure B.2, provide
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an interpretation of shifts in U.S. money velocity over the post-WWII period in which
permanent inflation shocks caused by permanent disturbances to the multiplier of M2-
M1 caused, via the Fisher effect, permanent fluctuations in nominal interest rates.
This, in turn, triggered permanent portfolio reallocations, first out of M1 and into
M2-M1, and subsequently, with the Volcker disinflation, in the opposite direction,
thus causing first an increase, and then a decrease in M1 velocity, and the opposite
pattern of variation in the velocity of M2-M1.
As for other disturbances, permanent GDP shocks explain, as expected, essentially
all of the long-horizon FEV of consumption, and–again as expected–a dominant,
but slightly smaller fraction of the FEV of GDP. Shocks to the real rate have played
an important role only for the 3-month Treasury bill rate,29 and, to a lesser extent,
for the 10-year bond yield and M1 velocity. Finally, the residual permanent inflation
shock only plays a sizeable role for the 10-year bond yield.
Counterfactual simulations Evidence from counterfactual simulations in which
we ‘kill off’ one shock at a time provide additional validation to the previously dis-
cussed interpretation of post-WWII fluctuations in U.S. money velocity. Whereas,
absent the residual shocks to the velocity of M2-M1, essentially nothing would have
changed compared to the actual historical outcomes,30 eliminating the shocks to the
multiplier of M2-M1 would have produced signifiacnt changes in all series except–as
is logically to be expected–GDP and consumption. Specifically, absent such shocks,
the large, hump-shaped fluctuation in the multiplier of M2-M1 over the post-WWII
period would have disappeared, and the multiplier would have been essentially flat.
With a trend-stationary monetary base, this, in turn, logically implies that the Great
Inflation should not have taken place: And in fact, as the third panel in the first row
of Figure B.3 shows, counterfactual inflation would have peaked at about 5 per cent,
compared to the actual historical peak in excess of 12 per cent. In turn, nominal in-
terest rates–once again, because of the Fisher effect–would have been significantly
lower, and very broadly flat, than they have historically been. Finally, because of
this, M1 velocity would also hae exhibited much less variation, and it would have
been broaly flat, whereas the velocity of M2-M1 would have exhibited a steady in-
crease over the entire sample period, as opposed to its U-shaped actual historical
evolution. By contrast, killing off either permanent inflation shocks, or permanent
shocks to the real rate, would have produced minor-to-negligible changes compared
to the actual historical paths.
29This result is the same as King et al.’s (1991).
30As mentioned, the counterfactual paths obtained by killing off permanent GDP shocks are even
closer to the actual historical paths, to the point that they are essentially indistinguishable. Because
of this we do not report them, but they are available upon request.
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B.2 Canada
B.2.1 Results from unit root and cointegration tests
Table B.1 reports results from unit root tests for Canada for the period 1961Q1-
2006Q4.16 The null of unit root cannot be rejected for any series, with the partial
exception of inflation and consumption per capita. In either case we regard we regard
the null of a unit root as not having been convincingly rejected, and in what follows
we will therefore consider both series as I(1).
Table B.2 reports results from cointegration tests. The following findings emerge
from the table:
() in line with the results for the post-WWII United States, there is very strong
evidence of cointegration between the 3-month Treasury bill rate and M1 velocity,
whereas there is no evidence of cointegration with either M2 velocity, or the velocity or
M2-M1. Once again, this points towards the presence of a stable long-run demand for
M1, and of permanent velocity shocks specific to M2-M1 which prevent cointegration
between the velocities of either M2-M1, or M2, and the short rate.
() As for the larger systems, we detect two cointegration vectors for the system
featuring the velocities of M1 and M2-M1, and one for the system featuring the
velocity of M2. In fact, based on the economic logic we previously mentioned for the
post-WWII United States, we should have expected to detect one more cointegration
vector in either system. In practice, however, imposing for Canada the identified
number of cointegration vectors, or further imposing an additional one, makes no
material difference to the results,31 so that in what follows we have chosen to work
with the number of cointegration vectors which has been identified by Johansen’s
tests.
B.2.2 Evidence
Figures B.5 to B.8 show, for Canada for the period 1961Q1-2006Q4, the same evidence
reported in Figures B.1 to B.4 for the post-WWII United States. For reasons of
space, in what follows we exclusively focus upon, and discuss, the main similarities
and differences between these results and the corresponding evidence for the United
States.
As for the identification of the structural disturbances, the only difference with
the post-WWII United States has to do with the fact that, as discussed in Section 2.1,
the Canadian monetary base exhibits strong evidence of a unit root. As a result, after
having idetified, as for the United States, a permanent shock to log real consumption
per capita, we subsequently identify a residual permanent shock to log nominal M0
per capita,32 as the only other shock which is allowed to have a permanent impact
31This alternative set of results is reported in the online appendix.
32 ‘Residual’ because, quite obviously, permanent shocks to GDP and consumption should be
expected to have a corresponding permanent impact on the monetary base.
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on the monetary base. Then, conditional on these two shocks, we identify, exactly
as before, the remaining four shocks to the multiplier of M2-M1, inflation, the real
interest rate, and to the velocity of either M2-M1 (in the baseline system), or M2 (in
the alternative system).
Turning to the main substantive findings, our key results for the post-WWII
United States–pertaining to () a uniformly minor role played by velocity shocks
specific to M2-M1, and () the distortions in the inference produced by failing to
split M2 into its M1 and non-M1 components–still hold here (compare the sixth
panels in the sixth rows of Figures 10 ad 12). Once again, the reason for () is that
permanent shocks to the multiplier of M2-M1–as well as shocks to the monetary
base, and to the real interest rate–have an opposite impact on the velocities of M1
and M2-M1,33 so that failure to split M2 into its two components causes such impacts
to largely cancel out in the aggregate, thus spuriously creating the need for another
shock in order to explain the dynamics of M2 velocity. Other results are almost
uniformly in line with those for the United States. Finally, these results are also
robust to imposing three cointegration vectors instead of two (this alternative set of
results is reported in the online appendix).
33As for the shock to the real rate, the response of M1 velocity is only significant at the one
standard deviation level.
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Table A.1 Bootstrapped p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg,
and Stock unit root tests on the central bank rate
Lag order
p=1 p=2
United Kingdom, 1816-1913 0.00 0.00
France, 1800-1913 0.00 0.01
Austria, 1818-1913 0.08 0.04
Norway, 1819-1913 0.01 0.02
Sweden, 1856-1913 0.05 0.03
Finland, 1867-1913 0.07 0.04
Spain, 1874-1913 0.06 0.02
Japan, 1883-1913 0.03 0.15
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA pro-
cesses. Tests are with an intercept and no time trend.
Table B.1 Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Bootstrapped
p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests
Lag order:
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4
In levels, without a time trend
GDP deflator inflation 0.001 0.025 0.090 0.117
3-month Treasury bill rate 0.302 0.263 0.235 0.264
10-year government bond yield 0.687 0.692 0.637 0.589
M1 velocity 0.889 0.930 0.875 0.925
M2 velocity 0.587 0.505 0.563 0.570
Velocity of M2-M1 0.215 0.224 0.260 0.258
In levels, with a time trend
Log nominal M0 per capita 0.965 0.971 0.963 0.969
Log real GDP per capita 0.297 0.282 0.326 0.374
Log real consumption per capita 0.006 0.058 0.046 0.102
In differences,
without a time trend
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4
GDP deflator inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3-month Treasury bill rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10-year government bond yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M1 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M2 velocity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Velocity of M2-M1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log real GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log real consumption per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA processes.
Table B.2 Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Results from Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace tests of the null of no cointegration against the
alternative of h or more cointegrating vectors:
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
3-month Treasury bill rate and
M1 velocity 40.137 (2.0E-4)
M2 velocity 15.388 (0.226)
velocity of M2-M1 12.301 (0.270)
9-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 285.466 (0.000) 207.724 (0.000) 145.541 (0.000) 98.761 (0.003)
8-variables system with M2 velocity 196.391 (0.037) 133.401 (0.081) 97.926 (0.032) 68.486 (0.017)
Maximum eigenvalue tests of h
versus h+1 cointegrating vectors:
0 versus 1 1 versus 2 2 versus 3 3 versus 4
3-month Treasury bill rate and
M1 velocity 38.456 (1.0E-4)
M2 velocity 12.790 (0.245)
velocity of M2-M1 8.301 (0.437)
9-variables system with the velocities of M1 and M2-M1 77.742 (0.008) 62.183 (0.035) 46.780 (0.195) –
8-variables system with M2 velocity 62.990 (0.050) 35.475 (0.815) – –
 Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications, based on Cavaliere et al.’s (2012) methodology.
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Figure B.1  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Impulse-response functions to the permanent shocks, 
                with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure B.2  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
                the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure B.3  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Counterfactual simulations killing off 
                permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
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Figure B.4  United States, 1959Q2-2008Q3: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
                the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure B.5  Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Impulse-response functions to the permanent shocks, 
                with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
 
 
 40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.6  Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
                the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
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Figure B.7  Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Counterfactual simulations killing off 
                permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands  
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 Figure B.8  Canada, 1961Q1-2006Q4: Fractions of forecast error variance explained by either of 
                the permanent shocks, with 16-84 and 5-95 bootstrapped confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
